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1. Introduction: 
Studies of industry evolution conclude that established firms tend to outperform startups 
(Dunne et al., 1988; Mitchell, 1991; Klepper and Simons, 2000a; Klepper, 2002).  A variety of 
possible sources of advantage have been identified.  Established firms are larger, endowed with 
complementary assets like distribution and marketing networks, better management capabilities, 
and even perhaps superior technology.  The relative importance of these factors in the advantage 
that established firms enjoy over startups remains unclear.  The literature also concludes that the 
pre-entry experience of entrants is very important, so that spinoffs from existing firms or startups 
from related industries outperform others.  Once again, the precise nature of the relevant prior 
experience is less clear (Chatterji, 2006). 
Existing literature implicitly focuses on firms that rely upon internally generated 
technologies.  We explicitly consider how markets for technology condition the entry strategy 
and the subsequent performance of entrepreneurs, and changes the relative value of different 
types of firm competencies.1 At the very least, the existence of technology suppliers expands the 
strategy space of the entrepreneur. As Gambardella and Giarratana (2006) point out, technology 
holders may choose to license technology to others.  Other entrants, especially incumbent firms 
that diversify into a new market may find it more profitable to acquire external technology than 
to develop the technology by themselves.  (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Gans, Hsu 
and Stern, 2002).  
In addition, markets for technology may also condition the subsequent fate of entrants.  
Lowered entry barriers may mean more competition and greater likelihood of exit.  More 
interestingly, the relative performance of different types of entrants may also be affected, 
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 Gambardella and Giarratana (2006) analyze the factors that condition how encryption technology holders choose 
between licensing technology rather than offering products for sale. 
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changing the relative importance of production and marketing ability compared to technical 
ability.  
To answer these questions we develop a novel dataset of entrants in the Information 
security Market (ISM).  Before the internet, computer attacks, with the exception of viruses, 
were largely restricted to large computer networks typically owned by the government.  The 
large scale adoption of the internet in the mid 1990’s meant that a growing amount of 
commercially valuable data had to be protected against attackers, accidental loss, and prying 
eyes.  The growth of digital products (including songs and videos) required means of controlling 
the access and use of those products.  Further, online commerce required authenticating 
participants, secure communications and controlling access.  More recently, users have to be 
protected against spam and “phishing” attacks, which induce unwary users to part with 
confidential information.  Thus, the ISM consists of several submarkets that emerged at different 
points in time.   
Given the general-purpose nature of information technology, entrants into the ISM are 
diverse: software, hardware or telecommunication equipment producers, startups with founders 
with prior experience from these same IT industries, as well as from industries such as defense 
and financial services have all entered the ISM.  However, what perhaps distinguishes the ISM is 
the rarity of spinoffs and perhaps also the number of pioneering startups founded by very skilled 
hobbyists or tinkerers, whom we shall call “hackers”.2 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief background on information 
security technologies.  Section 3 reviews literature and provides a theory that guides our 
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 Hackers lack advanced degrees in computer sciences, nor do they hold important positions in established ICT firms 
at the time of founding.  Yet, in ISM, they are among the pioneers and, more interestingly, the source of many of the 
current market leaders. 
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empirical analysis in section 5. Section 4 provides a description of the data.  In section 6 we 
conclude with a summary of our key findings of this work.   
2. Information security market: 
Four major types of technologies are involved in securing information and computer 
networks: (i) Encryption, to disguise data and preserve confidentiality of transactions (ii) Packet 
inspection and filtering, based on pattern matching (for firewalls, anti-virus and intrusion 
detection) (iii) Image matching, to identify end users to systems based on their physical attributes 
such as fingerprints, retina and (iv) “Single sign on” technology to enable users to be 
authenticated to multiple systems just using one common password. 
(i) Encryption: Encryption relies heavily upon the science of cryptography.  Before the internet, 
encryption was used to protect communication, such as communication between ATM terminals 
and central banking servers.  Innovation in computer networking accentuated the need for more 
sophisticated methods of encryption on a public computer network, resulting in the invention of 
public key encryption in 1976.3 Encryption uses encryption keys generated by multiplying two 
large random prime numbers.  Decryption, on the other hand, involves factoring this large 
number to discover the prime number that was originally used to encrypt the data.  Public key 
cryptography was first applied for encrypting email. 
Internet, e-commerce, and the increased sophistication of attacks, increased the need for 
encryption technology. This in turn, meant larger keys had to be used to encrypt data which, 
required greater processing power.  Also, the need for encryption solutions on small devices such 
as smart cards, cell phones and PDAs (where limited amount of data, including encryption 
strings, can be stored) required more efficient methods of encryption.  Certicom, another 
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 In 1976, a public key technology called the Diffie-Hellman algorithm was invented at Stanford University.  RSA, 
another key algorithm for public key cryptography was invented at MIT in 1977.   
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important player in the encryption market, successfully invented a more efficient algorithm for 
public key cryptography called elliptic curve cryptography in 1997. At present RSA and 
elliptical curve algorithms invented by Certicom are the two most widely used encryption 
methods to protect data.  
(ii) Pattern Matching and filtering: Pattern matching technology builds on routing technologies 
that direct internet communications.  These products scan network traffic and make decisions 
based on parameters such as the source and destination of internet traffic.  The advent of the 
internet required more sophisticated filtering and checks.  The most important filtering 
technology is the “stateful inspection” technology, which, is a method to keep track of previous 
communication between two networked computers. This technology was invented by, 
Checkpoint Technologies, a startup established in Israel, in 1996.   
(iii) Image matching: Image matching or biometric technologies are used to verify or recognize 
the identity of a person based on a physical characteristic like fingerprints or retina patterns.  
There are three basic methods (1) a mechanism to scan and capture an image; (2) compression, 
processing and comparison of the image to a database of stored images; and (3) interface with 
applications systems.4 Large hardware producers like Hughes, IBM, Burroughs and Harris 
Corporation, and defense contractors were among the early participants in this technology, as 
biometric technologies were used principally by government agencies and financial firms prior to 
1997. With increased use of mobile computing, the demand for biometric technologies has 
grown rapidly. 
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 Source http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/organizations/HQ-AFMC/LG/LSO/LOA/bio.htm.  Retrieved February 4th, 
2007. 
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(iv) Single sign on: Single sign on technologies are algorithms that enable users to use one 
password and log on to multiple computer systems.  For example, Kerberos invented at MIT, is 
widely used in universities to authenticate students and staff to multiple systems with just one 
password.  Since one of the selling points of e-commerce was the ability to conduct transactions 
between two unknown parties, verifying identity instantaneously became another critical 
function of this technology.   
(v) Services: In addition, consulting firms advise enterprises about compliance with regulatory 
mandates, including HIPPA, Sarbanes Oxley, Basle II, Gramm-Leachman-Bailey, and various 
DoD mandates, such as Phipps and Common Criterion.  
ISM products typically combine one or more of ISM technologies (see table 1 below)5 as 
a product to cater to the needs of users.  For instance, a Virtual Private Network (VPN) product 
uses encryption technology to enable organizations and desktop users to securely communicate 
using the internet.  Authentication products use encryption technology (sometimes combined 
with pattern or image matching) to regulate user access to the network.   
Entrants into the ISM can either be in the product market (also called “downstream”), in 
the licensing market (“upstream”), or both (also called “both”). In our data, there are few 
upstream entrants, all of them licensing encryption technology. RSA and Certicom are two of the 
most successful firms that license encryption technology mainly to network security and 
authentication product vendors. 6 Other technologies such as image matching, pattern matching 
and single sign on are sold by vendors that also sell products incorporating the technology. For 
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 In our empirical analysis, we shall frequently group downstream segments into two - those based on encryption 
technologies, and those based on other technologies.  However, the results are not affected by treating firewalls, 
antivirus, spam, hardware and consulting as distinct from each other and from network security, authentication and 
encryption products.  Neither are our results affected by treating only network security and encryption products as 
encryption based and leaving out authentication (which also relies upon single sign-on technology, and perhaps also 
image matching.) 
6
 RSA after its merger with Security Dynamics in the late 1990’s entered product markets. 
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instance, Finjan software not only sells an antivirus product, but they also license pattern-
matching technology. Similarly, Checkpoint not only manufactures and sells firewall known as 
Firewall-1, but it also licenses pattern matching technology to other firewall producers. 
 Table 1 ISM technology and product map 
 Encryption Image-matching Pattern 
matching 
Single Sign-On 
Firewall   X  
Antivirus   X  
Authentication X X  X 
Spam   X  
Network (VPN) X    
Encryption X    
Hardware   X   
Consulting     
3. Previous literature and Theory: 
Our work draws from two streams of literature: strategy literature and entrepreneurship 
literature. 
Evolutionary economists conjecture that the historical antecedents of entrepreneurs, 
especially pre-entry experiences not only condition entry strategies, but also subsequent 
performance.  These capabilities include technology, production expertise and facilities, brand 
name and reputation, human assets, established marketing channels, that are typically rare, 
valuable, imperfectly mobile (Barney, 1991; Markides and Williamson, 1996) and typically must 
be accumulated internally (Dierickx and Kool, 1989). In fact, many empirical researchers take 
the view that one reason that firm size is positively correlated with survival is because firm size 
captures the effects of learning and accumulation of relevant competitive assets post entry 
(Geroski, 1995), a fact that is also true of small firms (See Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995 or 
Dunne et al 1989 for example).  
Diversifying entrants tend to enter industries whose resource requirements are similar to 
their own.  For instance, in the television industry, many of the early entrants were radio 
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producers (Klepper and Simons, 2000a).  Similarly in the automobile industry, entrepreneurs 
with experience in manufacturing carriages and bicycles not only entered early relative to other 
entrants but also survived longer (Klepper, 2002).  Many studies of large manufacturing firms 
conclude that a greater fit between the resource requirements of the new industry and that of the 
potential entrant increases the likelihood of entry (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Chang, 1997; 
Merino and Rodriguez, 1997; Silverman, 1999).  The fit could be based on technology or 
marketing. For instance, in the television industry, 14 out the 16 top radio producers in 1940 
diversified into the television industry (Klepper and Simmons, 2000).  Similarly, in the 
automobile industry about 47% of the entrants diversified from related industries that included 
bicycle, carriage or engine manufacturing (Carroll et al, 1996).  
Although diversifiers are the most important type of entrant, startups, including firms 
spun out of existing producers (spinoffs), typically constitute the majority of entrants (Dunne, 
Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988).  Spinoffs may occur due to disagreements between the manager 
and employee (Klepper and Thompson, 2005) typically about how best to exploit new idea. 
Spinoffs could also occur when property rights are non-existent or weak or when the employee 
owns the rights to an invention (Anton and Yao, 1995). When the external environment is 
conducive to startups parent firms might actively encourage exploration of new ideas and exploit 
it in house (Hellmann, 2006).  Unlike other industries studied by scholars, there are far fewer 
spinoffs in ISM compared to other industry settings, perhaps reflecting the relative youth of ISM, 
and the fact that the industry is relatively not manufacturing intensive in nature.  
Lead users, with extensive knowledge of consumer preferences, were also sources of 
entry into even manufacturing centric industries such as typesetting (Tripsas, 2001).  Many 
industries also witness entry by entrepreneurs with very specific technical knowledge.  In the 
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medical devices industry, for instance, clinical doctors often identify opportunities that lead to 
new types of devices (Chatterji, 2006). 
Pre-entry experience may also be critical for subsequent performance (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002).  For instance, Thompson (2002), using data on the ship building industry, 
found that pre-entry experience of entrants has a strong and long- lasting positive effect on firm 
survival that went beyond scale economies and learning subsequent to entry.  Klepper (2002) and 
Carroll et al, (1996) found similar patterns for automobiles, Mitchell (1989) for medical imaging, 
and Klepper and Simons, (2000a) for televisions. 
However there is less consensus on which types of pre-experience is more valuable, 
perhaps because the nature of industry dictates which experiences are more valuable than others.  
For instance, in televisions, the ability to conduct R&D was a distinct source of advantage to the 
radio manufactures that not only enabled them to enter early but also survive longer (Klepper 
and Simons, 2000a).  In the medical imaging industry, the advantage to diversifying entrants was 
due to their superiority in sales and distribution (Mitchell, 1989).   
Similarly, while prior research has shown that pre-entry experiences of founders 
influence subsequent performance of startups, the type of experience that conditions subsequent 
performance varies with the industry that is investigated.  Startups from related parents were 
more likely to succeed in automobiles (Klepper, 2002) and shipbuilding industries (Thompson, 
2002) by virtue of their experience in fabrication.  In lasers, spinoffs succeeded based on their 
technical expertise gained while working for the parent (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005).  In other 
industries, spinoff success was based on non-technical learning, such as knowledge of FDA 
approval process in medical devices (Chatterji, 2006).  In our empirical analysis we compare the 
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subsequent performances of different types of entrants and also the sources of such performance 
advantages. 
Prior work by strategy scholars indicates that not only do markets for technology exist 
within ISM, but more importantly they also condition firm strategy (Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella, 2001; Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002).  Encryption technologies are patent intensive 
relative to other ISM technologies and are extensively licensed (Giarratana, 2004).  Gambardella 
and Giarratana (2007) analyze how markets for technology affect the choice between licensing 
or developing a product.   
In this paper, we also explore how the presence of markets for technology influences 
entry strategy and subsequent performance of firms in the ISM. Also we explore which 
competencies are relatively more important than others both in the presence and absence of 
markets for technology.  
Theory 
We motivate our empirical analysis with a stylized model to derive predictions to guide 
our empirical analysis. We make several simplifying assumptions, particularly about inter-firm 
heterogeneity and the sources of pre-entry uncertainty to develop a tractable model where both 
the product market and the market for technology are in equilibrium. An important simplification 
is that we do not analyze industry dynamics. Rather, all firms enter at the same time. At the time 
of entry, firms are uncertain of their profitability in the product market. Following entry, this 
uncertainty is resolved and some firms exit. The market clearing prices in the product and 
technology markets reflect this entry and exit. 
Notation and assumptions: 
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We assume that firms entering the product market require technology and the ability to 
produce and market the product(s).  A proportion of the potential entrants, λ, are endowed with a 
technology, while others have to acquire it from a technology supplier. Firms endowed with 
technology decide whether to enter only the product market (downstream), only the technology 
market (upstream) or both (“both” segment).  
Firms differ in how efficiently they can produce and sell an ISM product. In general, 
efficiency is multifaceted.  However, we assume that more efficient firms produce and sell a 
higher quantity denoted by q. Thus q is a summary measure of the differences in efficiency (as 
well as scale), and is distributed in the population with distribution function F(q). The cost 
function for firms in the product market is cq + θ, where c is the marginal cost and θ is a fixed 
cost. 7 The actual fixed cost of each firm is θ +ε, where ε is a mean zero iid random variable. At 
the time of entry, firms do not observe ε, and thus are uncertain about their true profitability in 
the product market. However after entry, this uncertainty is resolved. This is a simple modeling 
device to produce exit from the product market, and is a variant of the approach used in 
Jovanovic (1982).  Ignoring product heterogeneity, we assume that the demand for the product 
D(p), is decreasing in p, the product price.   
Modeling the technology market is more challenging. We adopt a reduced form 
approach. Each licensor earns license revenues of L. Licensees buy technology at a price of τ. 
We do not model how τ is determined. Instead, τ is simply assumed to be a decreasing function 
of the total number of licensors, M. We further assume that there are diseconomies of scope 
when firms enter “both” segment, denoted by γ per unit of output produced and sold by the firm. 
This cost denotes the rent dissipation effect due to erosion of profits due to another firm 
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 Even for digital products such as information security products, there are incremental costs of reaching and 
servicing additional buyers, customizing products for their needs and so on. 
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(licensees) competing in the product market (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). All licensors incur a sunk 
entry cost of E. Finally, we assume that there are some technology suppliers that are pure 
licensors, whose number, b, is exogenous to the model.  These can be thought of representing 
inventors and university researchers that have developed technology that they offer for license. 
Underlying this reduced form we have in mind a situation where technologies offered for 
license are symmetric but each potential buyer has some idiosyncratic preferences, reflecting its 
own market niche. Licensors compete for each potential buyer in a Vickery type second price 
auction. The winning licensor is paid the incremental value it offers over the next best bidder. 
This would lead to the familiar outcome where the market is divided equally among the suppliers 
and all suppliers charge the same non-zero price, which decreases with the total number of 
suppliers, but does not depend upon the number of buyers.  
Profits 
Profits in the downstream segment (product market) are given by ПD = (p-c)q –θ. The 
profits of firms that both supply technology and produce is given by ПB = (p-c-γ)q –θ+L-E. The 
profits of a firm that only supplies technology is given by  ПL = L-E.  
Entry 
Firms not endowed with technology enter only expected profits (p-c)q - θ are greater than 
τ, the cost of licensing technology. The probability of entry is given by 





−
+
qcp
F )(
τθ
. Figure 1 
plots the profit of different types of entrants as a function of q. Firms endowed with technology 
do not produce but instead only license when 
γ
θ
−− cp
 > q . When 
γ
θ
−− cp
 < q < 
γ
EL −
, they 
both sell products and license, and exclusively sell products when q > 
γ
EL −
. Firms not endowed 
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with technology enter when q >
cp −
+τθ
. The share of entrants with technology that enter “both” is 
given by 












−−
−




 −
γ
θ
γ
λ
cp
FELF . Similarly, the share of entrants with technology that 
exclusively sell is just 











 −
−
γ
λ ELF1 , and the share that only license is 





−− γ
θλ
cp
F .                      
Exit: Post entry, firms realize an operating cost of θ+ε, where ε denotes iid shocks that is mean 
zero, distributed H(.). The probability of exit for firms that enter downstream is given by the 
probability that (p-c)q–(θ+ε)<0,  which is just 1-H[(p-c)q –θ]. Firms that entered the “both” 
segment have a higher probability of exit given by 1-H[(p-c-γ)q- θ]. Note that we implicitly 
assume that firms that are exclusive technology suppliers do not exit the ISM. Our data largely 
supports this assumption. Of a total of 17 pure technology suppliers, only 1 exited.8  
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 The assumption of no exit from the licensing market is made mostly for modeling convenience.  We conjecture 
that allowing exit from the licensing market will not qualitatively affect our results.  It does, however, complicate 
exit probabilities for firms in the “both” segment. 
Figure 1 Entry strategy as a function of q 
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Market Equilibrium 
Market equilibrium involves two interrelated markets: The product market and the 
technology market. Equilibrium in product market implies that the quantity supplied by 
producers must equal the quantity demanded. The quantity supplied in the product market is the 
total quantity supplied by the survivors in the product market. This condition is thus given by 

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(1) 
In the technology market, market clearing is more subtle.  Any given licensor can sell as 
many licenses as required. The equilibrium condition is that the total license revenues (of all 
technology suppliers), should equal the total licensing payments.  The former is LM, and the 
latter is equal to the number of licensees multiplied by the license price τ.  
T
cp
FLM 











−
+
−−=
τθ
τλ 1)1(       (2) 
where M is given by 
bELFTM +




 −
=
γ
λ         (3) 
To get some intuition into these market clearing conditions, figure 2 shows how M and p 
are related for each market clearing condition.  The PP curve represents equilibrium in the 
product market, and TT curve represents equilibrium in the technology market. While PP curve 
is downward sloping, the TT curve is upward sloping (all proofs are contained in the appendix). 
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The intersection represents market equilibrium, with p* and M* as the equilibrium price and 
technology suppliers. Figure 2 shows that an increase in b increases M* and reduces p*.  
The model has a number of testable predictions.  The formal statements and proofs are all 
contained in the appendix. Here we state the results verbally. As shown in figure 1, it predicts 
that larger firms will, if they enter, produce rather than license, even if these firms have 
proprietary technology.  Licensing to others is not attractive because such licensing creates 
competition in the product market and dissipates rents.  In our empirical analysis, we measure 
the entrant size.  However, we have a number of other measures that plausibly proxy for different 
dimensions of efficiency such as the number of trademarks, as well as whether the firm is an 
existing firm entering the ISM market.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Result 1: Increases in firm scale increases the proportion of downstream entry.  More generally, 
increases in firm efficiency increase the proportion of downstream entry. 
The model implies that an increase in b increases the probability of entry into the 
downstream segment by firms endowed with technology, as well as those that are not. An 
increase in b has two effects. It decreases the license price, τ, and reduces p, the product price. 
Figure 2 Equilibrium 
M
pp*p**
M**
M*
P T
T
T
T
P
P
P
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For producers endowed with technology, an increase in b makes licensing less attractive: the 
firm indifferent between downstream and both now prefers downstream. For firms without 
technology, the net effect is to encourage entry, which by definition is downstream.  
Result 2: An increase in competition in the market for technology will increase the probability of 
downstream entry.  
If competition in the market for technology lowers entry barriers into the product market, 
this also implies more intense competition in the product market.  More intense competition 
should hurt the average performance, increasing the likelihood of exit or slowing growth rates.  
When more firms enter due to lower entry barriers, prices fall, resulting in higher exits rates on 
average.  Thus, a reduction of entry barriers increases the probability of exit by increasing the 
overall number of firms and lowering prices.  In our model, entrants account for this higher 
probability of exit in their entry decisions.  However, since there is no sunk entry cost, this does 
not affect their entry decisions.  A modest entry cost will not change the result since ultimately 
the higher exit is due to lower prices, which will only happen if there is net entry. 
Result 3: Increased competition in market for technology will increase average exit rates. 
Since the probability of exit is decreasing in q, firms with higher values of q are less 
likely to exit, all else equal.  More generally, efficient producers and marketers of products are, 
all else constant, less likely to exit the ISM as well. 
Result 4:  Increases in firm scale reduce exit. More efficient firms have a lower probability of 
exit relative to less efficient firms.  
The final result concerns how increases in the competition in the market for technology 
differentially affect firms with different scales of operation. In our model, there are two 
offsetting forces.  Firms with larger q are more likely to suffer greater losses from a drop in 
17 
price. However, more efficient and larger firms are also more likely to survive cost shocks 
relative to less efficient firms.  Which of these effects dominates depends upon the distribution of 
the cost shocks.  We show that under some restrictions, which are, for instance satisfied by the 
exponential family (including the normal), the latter effect outweighs the former, so that an 
increase in competition in the market for technology increases exit for smaller firms by more, 
than for larger firms. Although this result is a limited one, we believe it reflects a broader 
intuition, namely that as technology becomes cheaper, the sources of differentiation shift towards 
other sorts of assets, including production and marketing.  In our model, we do not allow for 
differential access to technology, or for a competitive advantage to firms with proprietary 
technology.  We conjecture that in a model with these features such a result would hold a 
fortiori. 
Result 5: Increased competition in market for technology increases average exit rate by more for 
smaller firms than for larger firms.  
 
4. Data: 
Our sample consists of 343 security firms, followed from the time of entry until 2004 or 
their exit, whichever is earlier.  From the Corptech directory, we obtained names of all firms that 
entered ISM between 1989 and 2004.  This dataset was manually augmented with information on 
submarkets of entry using Internet archives (www.archive.org), an internet web site that 
maintains historical archives of many web sites.   
Firms in our sample exited due to two reasons: non viability of the business (death) or 
acquisition by another firm (merger) (identified using Lexis-Nexus mergers and acquisitions 
database).  These were coded separately in the dataset.  We distinguish between successful 
acquisitions (based on reported transaction values) and distress acquisitions. As we will explain 
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later, while comparing performance of firms in the ISM we treat the successful acquisitions as 
censored observations and distress acquisitions as death.  
In addition, we recorded the sources of entry by tracking information about the founders 
(for up to 4 founders) of security firms.  Such data was collected from a variety of publicly 
available data sources on the internet such as ZoomInfo (www.zoominfo.com), LinkedIn 
(www.linkedIn.com), Google Archives (www.archives.google.com), Internet Archive 
(www.archive.org) and, EDGAR database.   
We classified startups into one or more of the following categories based on the 
immediate prior experience of founders: spin-offs (firms founded by employees of an ISM firm), 
related startups (startups founded by employees of computer hardware, software or 
telecommunication firms), unrelated startups (founders from defense, finance, aerospace and 
automobile industries), university founders, hackers9 and IT consultants.10  In our empirical 
analysis, we frequently club unrelated startups with hackers and universities (referred to as 
“other” category henceforth) thereby, focusing the analysis on diversifiers, related startups, spin-
offs and unrelated startups. 
For all sample firms, we also collected the number of security related patents and all IT 
trademarks held by the firms at the time of entry into ISM from the U.S.PTO database.  Security 
related patents are those that belong to the US patent technological classes 705 subclass 50-79, 
380 and 726.  We then weighted the patents using the number of forward citations to account for 
their relative value and importance of patents (Trajtenberg, 1990).  For IT trademarks, we did 
keyword search on the US.PTO trademarks database (http://tess.uspto.gov) to gather the number 
                                                 
9
 Hackers are defined as those that (a) do not have a CS or EE degree, (b) do not have high level experience in IT 
firms and (c) were self-employed prior to founding the firm. 
10
 IT consultants are those that (a) have a CS or EE degree and (b) were self employed prior to founding the firm. 
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of IT related trademarks held by the firm.11 We also collected data on licensing transactions from 
the Lexis-Nexus database. We were able to identify if firms entered the ISM by licensing a 
technology only in the case of 120 firms. We use data on licensing transactions only in auxiliary 
regressions to test the robustness of our main results. 
We also identified the submarket of entry for all the firms using internet resources as 
stated above.  For each entrant we first determined the submarket of entry.  We then identified if 
entrants were selling only technology in which case they were classified as being technology 
suppliers (or “upstream”).  Firms that were selling only products were classified as 
“downstream” firms, while firms that sold both products and technology were classified as 
operating in “both” markets. In the data set there are 17 technology suppliers that entered the 
ISM.  
We also recorded the size of firms at the time of entry into the ISM. For startups this is 
the number of employees at the time of entry into the ISM. For diversifying entrants, we 
calculated size at the time of entry as follows: we first identified all the markets in which, 
diversifying entrants operated in at the time of entry; we then divided the total employees of the 
diversifier by the total number of markets that diversifiers operated in to get the size at the time 
of entry for diversifiers.  
Table 2-Description of measures used 
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev 
Downstream A dummy variable=1 if the entrant enters downstream 
segment conditional upon entering ISM 
326 0.64 0.48 
Log (1+security patents) Log of 1+ # of weighted security patents held by a firm at 
entry. This variable proxies technical capability 
326 0.37 0.91 
Log (1+ IT trademarks) Log of IT trademarks held by firm at entry.  326 0.94 1.01 
                                                 
11
 We used the following search query on the trademark database.  Trademark description includes ("computer") OR 
("hardware") OR ("pixel") OR ("telecom") OR ("telecommunications") OR ("software") OR ("Wireless") OR 
("computing") OR ("database") OR ("data base ") OR ("pixels") OR ("computer program") OR ("Network") OR 
("LAN") OR ("Networking") OR (" computer protocol ") OR (" Internet "). 
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Log (1+tech.suppliers) Log of 1+ lagged technology suppliers. This is a proxy for 
MFT 
326 2.52 0.51 
Log(1+Size) Log of 1+ # employees at entry. This is a proxy for scale 300 3.89 1.60 
Encryption market dummy Dummy variable for markets that use encryption 
technology; covers NW security, authentication and 
encryption product markets 
326 0.62 0.49 
Licensee  A dummy variable=1 if an entrant enters the ISM by 
licensing technology 
120 0.71 0.46 
Industry age Age of the industry measured from 1970 326 8.87 5.68 
326 6.88 4.94 ISM tenure Calculated as current year – ISM entry year 
   
ICTdummy =1 if the entrant is a diversifying ICT entrant 326 0.17 0.38 
Unrelated startup dummy =1 if the entrant has a founding member from an unrelated 
industry 
326 0.11 0.31 
Related startup dummy Startup with a founder from an ICT firm 326 0.48 0.5 
Competitors Lagged number of producers (in the same submarket) 326 22.80 18.30 
 
Sources of firm formation and patterns of entry into ISM: 
The ISM has grown considerably over the past 15 years.  The industry thus far has not 
experienced a shakeout, as also confirmed by Giarratana (2004).  In the 1980s, ISM mainly 
comprised of technologies rather than products used by a handful of enterprises and mainly by 
the defense industry.  Entry (figure 1) shows two peaks – first around 1989 and the second one 
around 1995.  The first peak was largely an after-effect of “moris” worm that sparked research in 
antivirus and network security technology.  The advent of the internet increased entry, 
particularly by startups.   
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Figure 3 - Entry and exit into ISM 
Entrants into the ISM have diverse origins (table 2).  About 83% of the entrants into the 
ISM are startups, broadly similar to that of automobile industry. About 54% of the startups 
(about 45% of all entrants) have at least one founding member from a related industry such as 
computer hardware, software or telecommunications industry, a proportion, very similar to 
automobiles (where related startups were 47% of total entrants). 
Table 3- Sources of entry in ISM 
Entrant type ISM Automobiles TV industry Medical 
devices 
Laser 
Diversifiers 17% 17%a; 35%b 30%e - - 
Hackers 10% - - - - 
Related startups 45% 47%a    
Unrelated 
startups 
21% 32%a - 34%c,y  44%d 
University 8% - - 29%c,z 26%d 
Spin-offs 5% 20%   18% 
Notes: The total proportion adds up to more than 100% because many firms have multiple founders. In our empirical 
analysis we club hackers and University professors with unrelated startups. 
a Carroll et al, 1996; b Klepper, 2002; c Chatterji, 2006; d Sleeper, 1996; e Klepper and Simons, 2000a 
z Compared with clinical doctors in medical devices industry. 
y Entrants from defense, financial services, insurance and aerospace compared with “outsider”+ serial entrepreneurs 
in medical devices industry.   
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The ISM also witnessed entry by university based startups particularly in encryption, a 
pattern that was true of the laser industry (Sleeper, 1998) as well as of medical devices (Chatterji, 
2006).  However, the proportion of such entrants was significantly lower (8% in ISM vs. 26% in 
laser and 29% in medical devices).  Two interesting patterns emerge from comparing the entry 
patterns of ISM with that of other industries. First, many ISM firms (about 10%) have been 
founded by hackers or hobbyists (see table 3).  Although such entry is virtually non-existent in 
other industries, it is not inconsistent with the view that in many industries lead users innovate, 
either to customize products or to fix problems in them.12 Hackers personify what von Hippel 
(2005) has dubbed the democratization of innovation, perhaps a throwback to the tinkerers and 
inventors of the 19th century. Second is the virtual absence of spin-offs in the ISM relative to 
other industries. While in most manufacturing based industries, spin-offs constitute a big 
percentage of all startups, only 5% of all entrants were startups.  
Overall, despite the pervasive nature of IT and non-manufacturing nature of the industry, 
the sources of entry in the ISM are surprisingly similar to other industries with two exceptions: 
first, is the possible exception of hackers and second is the virtual absence of spin-offs.  Yet, this 
exception is consequential.  An examination of the top 15 market leaders (as identified by the 
InformationSecurity magazine in 2007) in ISM suggests that diversifying entrants as well as 
hackers perform better relative to all other entrants, while none of the top performers are spin-
offs.  Of the top 15 market leaders, 6 or about 40% were hacker founded startups.  About a third 
are incumbent ICT trademarks diversifying into ISM.  Both of the top technology suppliers were 
startups that were founded by university professors.   
 
                                                 
12
 For instance, von Hippel, 2005 in his study found that nearly 50% of webmasters implemented custom extensions 
to the security module of Apache web server.   
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Table 4 ISM Market leaders 
Firm name 2007 sales Principal founder type Main Market 
Network Associates $987.30  Hacker Antivirus 
RSA Data Security $138.00  University Encryption technology 
Symantec $5,187.30  Hacker Antivirus 
Checkpoint $687.80  Related startup Firewall 
Computer Associates $595.0+ Hacker Antivirus 
Cisco $665.4+ Diversifier Firewall 
Aladdin $89.00  Hacker Authentication (encryption) 
Juniper $480.0+ Diversifier Network security (encryption) 
Sybari $8.80a  Other Spam 
Certicom $15.10  University Encryption technology 
Eeye security $11.20b  Hacker Firewall 
Secure computing corp $176.70  Diversifier Authentication (encryption) 
Internet Security Systems $329.80  Hacker Firewall 
Entrust $138.00  Diversifier Authentication (encryption) 
Trend Micro $618.90  Related startup Antivirus 
Source: Hoovers and Information Security magazine, April 2007; +Security revenues calculated using Gartner’s shipment data.  
a
 Was acquired by Microsoft for $6 billion in 2003. The sales figure represents estimated sales (by Hoovers) in 2007. b estimated 
sales in 2007. 
 
Timing of entry 
In many industries such as automobiles (Klepper, 2002) diversifying entrants were 
among the first to enter the ISM, while in certain other industries such as disk drives 
(Christensen, 1997), startups were among the first to enter.  There do not appear to be big 
differences in the mean time of entry between startups and diversifiers.  There are no significant 
differences between the timing of entry between different categories of startups, except that 
related startups enter ISM later than both diversifiers and other startups. Relative to diversifiers, 
startups were not only smaller at the time of entry but they also entered the industry with fewer 
security patents. 
Table 5 shows that the internet stimulated the demand for information security, with over 
80% (300 firms of a total of 343 firms) of the firms entering after 1995.  The proportion of firms 
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entering downstream segment also increased from just under 50% pre-internet to nearly 66% 
post-internet. Most of this increase is due to startups. Whereas pre-internet, only 36% of the 
startups were downstream, post-internet, 66% were downstream.  
In many manufacturing industries although startups constitute the major number of 
entrants, they are less successful (Dunne et al., 1988).  This is true of ISM as well (see table 6).  
Many previous studies provide insights into the reasons for this superior performance.  In some 
industries such as televisions, such performance advantages are driven by superior R&D 
capability (Klepper and Simons, 2000a). In other industries it is driven by superior 
complementary capability, specifically superior sales and distribution capability (medical 
imaging - Mitchell, 1989; Disk drives – King and Tucci, 2001).  Table 7 shows that diversifying 
entrants were not only larger at entry, but that they also had more security patents at entry. 
Table 5 - Patterns of entry 
  Before 1995 1996-2004 
  Upstream Downstream Both Total Upstream Downstream Both Total 
Diversifiers 0 11 7 18 1 26 12 39 
Related 
startups  
3 3 2 8 4 104 44 154 
Other startups 4 3 4 10 5 47 28 79 
Hacker 0 3 4 7 0 15 13 28 
All startups 7 9 10 25 9 166 87 261 
Period Total 7 20 17 43 10 192 97 300 
 
 
Table 6 - Size, patents, trademarks at entry and mean time of entrants 
 Diversifiers All Startups Related 
Startups 
Hackers Unrelated  
Startups 
Univ 
Log size at entry 4.12 
(0.26) 
3.06 
(0.19) 
3.30 
(0.25) 
3.52 
(0.63) 
1.98 
(0.75) 
3.24 
(0.72) 
Log (1+ sec.  patents ) at entry  0.85 
(0.12) 
0.31 
(0.05) 
0.28 
(0.08) 
0.31 
(0.17) 
0.36 
(0.14) 
0.65 
(0.19) 
Mean year of entry 1995 
(241.67) 
1995 
(48.16) 
1997 
(113) 
1994 
(319.87) 
1996 
(249.42) 
1994 
(320.54) 
Log (1+ IT trademarks) 1.13 
(0.05) 
- - - -  
Notes: Log of IT trademarks is not reported for startups because startups do not have trademarks at the time of entry.   
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Interestingly in the ISM, diversifying entrants are relatively more successful in the 
downstream segment (selling only products) suggesting that perhaps such performance 
advantages are due to superior production or marketing and distribution capabilities (see table 7). 
Also, the ISM seems be different from lasers in which spinoffs are successful.  In the ISM, 
spinoffs do not perform as well as diversifying entrants.  This is also the case with related 
startups as well.  We explore this further in our empirical analysis.  
Table 7 - Proportion of exits by market segment (raw proportions) 
 Exits Downstream Both 
Diversifiers 0.14 0.11 0.20 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
All startups 0.26 0.28 0.19 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Spinoffs 0.22 0.15 0.17 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Related  0.25 0.28 0.26 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Unrelated 0.16 0.20 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Technology and product markets: 
As explained earlier, firms in the sample were classified as technology suppliers, product 
vendors or both.  The technology markets are for encryption, image matching, pattern matching 
and single sign on technologies.  The product markets consist of firewall, antivirus, 
authentication, encryption, hardware, network security, spam control and consulting.   
In our empirical analysis, to conserve degrees of freedom, we consolidate product 
markets into those that use encryption technologies, and those based on other technologies.  The 
former consists of encryption products, network security, and authentication, while firewalls, 
antivirus, spam control, hardware and consulting make up the other category.  Our results are 
robust to inclusion of individual market specific fixed effects. 
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Encryption is by far the most patent intensive ISM technology (Giarratana, 2004).  
Roughly two thirds of all security patents related to encryption technology.  Encryption markets 
are also more licensing intensive.  Table 8 shows the number of patents per entrant and the 
number of licenses per entrant in ISM.  There were almost three times as many licensing 
transactions per firm in encryption markets relative to other markets.  Finally, for a subset of 
entrants, we were able to trace the source of technology.  The last column in table 8 shows that 
whereas 65% of the entry in encryption was based on licensed technology, the corresponding 
figure is only 13% for the other markets. 
Table 8 – Entry by submarket 
  Pre 1995 1996-
2004 
Total Security patents 
at entry 
Licensing 
deals per 
firm 
Upstream 
(pure 
licensors) 
% entrants 
with 
licensed 
technology 
Encryption 42 174 216 12.85 
(8.75) 
0.69 
(0.01) 
17 65 
Other markets 16 111 127 2.69 
(11.35) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0 13 
 
5. Empirical results: 
In order to test hypotheses that relate to how markets for technology condition entry and 
exit, we exploit the variation across segments (encryption based and non-encryption based) as 
well variation over time, in the number of specialized licensors.  Our benchmark specification 
uses the number of specialized licensors as a proxy for the extent of competition in the market 
for technology, and roughly corresponds to b in the theoretical model.   
Strictly speaking the number of specialized licensors is endogenous.  In our data, 
virtually all of these are the results of university invented technology being licensed by a startup.  
University invention may itself be related to characteristics of the underlying technology that are, 
in turn, related to conditions of entry and exit.  We address this concern by using a type of 
“difference-in-difference” strategy to identify the impact of interest.  For instance, in a number of 
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our hypotheses, markets for technology affect different types of entrants differentially.  By 
stressing these differences (in addition to the main effect), we can be more confident that what 
we see is the hypothesized effect, rather than merely unobserved differences across market 
segments.  
Entry strategy 
We first test the hypotheses related to entry strategy. We use a logit specification in 
which, the dependent variable downstream, takes a value of 1 if an entrant entered the 
downstream segment.  We use an encryption market dummy to control for unobserved 
differences across encryption based markets and others.  We distinguish between the types of 
entrants.  We use the log of (1+IT trademarks) as a proxy for the amount of marketing assets13 of 
a firm while we use log (1+Size) as a proxy for scale. Both these variables measure the extent to 
which, firms can efficiently produce and sell ISM product(s). We also use the log of the citation 
weighted number of security patents to control for technical competence.  In addition we also 
control for age (and age squared) of the industry and timing of entry – whether entry was before 
or after internet.  
Table 9 shows the results. The key independent variable is the number of technology 
suppliers, log(1+tech. suppliers). As noted before this variable varies both between market type, 
namely encryption vs. non-encryption and also over time.14   
Specification 1 shows that the number of IT trademarks held by firms at entry is 
associated with higher proportion of entry into the downstream segment. A 1% increase in the 
number of IT trademarks is associated with about a 1.9 times higher probability of entering 
                                                 
13Since startups have no complementary assets at the time of entry, this variable takes a value of 0 for startups. 
14
 About 42 firms do not report size at the time of entry. We start by not controlling for scale, thereby using all 326 
observations. In specification 2 we additionally control for scale along with all the independent variables as in 
specification 1. However while doing so we lose about 42 observations that relate to firms that do not report number 
of employees. 
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downstream segment. Specification 2 additionally shows that for size of the firm at time of entry 
itself increases the conditional probability of downstream entry.15  A 1% increase in size is 
associated with about a 12% higher probability of entering downstream segment. Further the ICT 
dummy in specification 1 suggests that diversifying ICT firms are about 1.8 times more likely to 
enter downstream segment relative to startups. These findings are consistent with the first 
prediction, namely that, firms with larger scale, and higher production and marketing capability 
are more likely to enter downstream, conditional on entry. These results are consistent with 
Gambardella and Giarratana (2006). By a symmetric argument, these results also suggest that 
insofar as startups are less efficient, lacking scale and marketing assets, startups are more likely 
to enter technology markets (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).  The coefficient estimate of log(1+ 
security patents) is negative and significant.  This result also supports the argument that patents 
mediate technology sale, and thus encourage firms to also license their technology (Arora and 
Ceccagnoli, 2006).   
Result 2 had implied that an increase in competition in market for technology increases 
the proportion of entry into the downstream segment. Specifications 1 through 3 show that the 
number of specialized technology suppliers increases the proportion of downstream entry.  From 
specification 2, a 10% increase in the number of technology suppliers is associated with a 95% 
higher probability of downstream entry.  This is consistent with entry by “licensing” in 
technology.  In specification 4, we explore if the presence of markets for technology encourages 
entry through licensing as implicit in our model.  If so, this should be reflected in how 
technology markets affect the entry of firms without technology.  To this end, we divide all 
entrants into those with at least one security patent at the time of entry and those with none. It is 
plausible that firms with at least one patent are much more likely to possess technology than 
                                                 
15
 Note that we lose 42 observations for which size at entry is not observed in specification 2. 
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those without a patent. We run two separate logistic regressions, one on a sample of firms that at 
least one patent at the time of entry and another on a sample of firms that had no patents at the 
time of entry.16  
Table 9- Logit regressions of entry strategy, dependent variable DOWNSTREAM=1 
  
  Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 
  
          Pat=0 Pat>0 
ICT firms dummy 0.57 ** 0.60 ** 0.67 ** 0.59 * 0.99 *** 
 
  (0.24)   (0.25)   (0.26)  (0.34)  (0.34)   
log(1+ sec. patents) -0.49 *** -0.48 *** -0.50 *   -   
 
  (0.14)   (0.15)   (0.20)       
Encryption markets dummy 0.91 *** 0.91 *** -  0.95 ** 1.07 *** 
 
  (0.21)   (0.22)     (0.44)  (0.45)   
Log (1+ tech. suppliers) 0.64 *** 0.67 ** 0.60 *** 2.13 *** 0.24   
`   (0.23)   (0.28)   (0.25)  (0.54)  (0.36)   
Log (1+ IT trademarks) 0.64 *** 0.67 ** 0.62 *** 0.79 *** 2.74 *** 
 
  (0.27) 
  
(0.29)   (0.25)  (0.30)  (1.00)   
Industry age -0.59   -0.83  -0.48 * -0.74  -1.82   
 
  (0.47) 
  
(0.54)   (0.52)  (0.60) 
 
(2.61)   
Industry age squared 0.01   0.01 *  0.01 ** 0.01  0.03   
 
  (0.01) 
  
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.04)   
Cohort 80-95 dummy 0.24   0.19   0.72 ** -0.18  2.01 *** 
 
  (0.27) 
  
(0.26)   (0.24)   (0.34)  (0.70)   
Spinoff dummy    -   0.96 *       
 
  
 
  
 
  (0.58)        
Related startups dummy    -   0.18       
 
  
 
  
 
  (0.31) 
  
   
  
Unrelated startups dummy    -   -0.17        
 
  
 
  
 
  (0.30) 
  
   
  
Log (1+Size) -   0.12 * -   -  - 
  
 
  
 
  
(0.07)    
  
   
  
Constant   5.35   8.88   6.71   8.84  16.27   
 
  (7.63) 
  
(8.30)   (8.88) 
  
(10.43)  (40.88)   
LL   -205.95   -181.18   -177.53   -158.45  -42.53   
Sub market dummies (7) None None Yes None None 
N   326   284   326   258   68   
Notes: ***Significant at 1%.  ** Significant at 5%.  * Significant at 10%.  Log of IT trademarks for startups is 0 
because startups do not have trademarks at the time of entry.   
 
We use the same set of controls as specification 1. The independent variable of interest is 
the number of technology suppliers. The results imply that an increase in the number of 
                                                 
16
 We use two separate regressions in view of the potential problems with interaction terms in nonlinear regression 
models (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
30 
technology suppliers increases the proportion of firms without patents entering downstream, 
whereas the effect is weaker and statistically insignificant for firms with at least one security 
patent. The point estimates suggest that among firms without patents, a 1% increase in 
technology suppliers increases the proportion of downstream entry by about 8.4 times, whereas 
for patentees, a 1% increase in technology suppliers decreases the proportion of firms that enter 
downstream by 1.2 times. The differential impact of markets for technology on firms with and 
without patents suggests that what our results are picking up is not simply unobserved 
differences across encryption and other markets, but rather properties of industries with markets 
for technology. Recall that in our model, an increase in the number of licensors directly 
increased entry by firms lacking technology, whereas for firms with technology, the effect was to 
shift firms from a mixed model (both licensing and products) to purely products. Our empirical 
results suggest that the increased entry of firms without technology is more pronounced than the 
shift in the business model of entrants with technology.  
Of course, firms do not have to buy technology in order to be downstream.  The 
coefficient of ICT dummy suggests that diversifying ICT firms, even when they have patents, are 
likely to enter downstream and not engage themselves in technology licensing.  This is especially 
true for firms with marketing assets (IT trademarks) and for larger firms.  All of this is consistent 
with the finding in Arora and Ceccagnoli (2005) that patents facilitate licensing, but only firms 
that lack specialized complementary capabilities. 
To summarize, our results suggest that diversifiers are more likely to enter downstream 
segments.  We also find evidence of markets for technology stimulating entry through licensing, 
especially by firms that have marketing capabilities and scale, while not affecting entry by firms 
with proprietary technology. 
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Performance 
In this section, we explore the determinants of performance using Cox proportional 
hazard regressions of exit.  We consider startups at risk of exit from the time the startup was 
established while diversifying entrants are at risk from the time of entry into ISM.  Observations 
that relate to firms that were still alive at 2004 were considered as censored observations.  
Moreover, we also considered as censored observations where the firm was acquired on friendly 
terms, excluding distress sales which are treated as exits. 
The use of survival as a measure of performance is very common (Klepper and Simons 
2000a; Carroll et al.1996; Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Thompson 2005).  It is possible, however, 
that exit decisions of incumbent diversifiers may differ from those of startups.  Diversifiers may 
have deeper pockets, or may be willing to lose a little money in security markets to achieve other 
goals.  On the other hand, startups that relate to founders that identify personally with the 
business and may tend to linger on long after it is clear that the business is not viable.  Thus, 
though exit decisions may depart from the expected profitability of the firm, the resulting bias, if 
any, is unclear.   
We use the same set of firm and market characteristics as before.17 Additionally, to allow 
for time and age dependence, we control for the age and square of the age of the firm (using ISM 
tenure and ISM tenure2), as well as whether the firm entered before 1995.  Finally, with the 
exception of specification 2, we also control for the number of producers within the same 
submarket (competitors) to control for the intensity of competition.  
As is the case with many other industries, diversifiers survive longer than startups.  In 
specification 1, diversifiers are almost 80% less likely to exit relative to startups.  Note that all 
                                                 
17
 Also note since 42 (13%) firms do not report their size, we interact log(size) with size not reported dummy =1 if 
the firm did not report size. 
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other sources of advantage find support as well.  Result 4 implied that scale and marketing assets 
should improve performance, as should proprietary technology. The estimation results broadly 
confirm this.  A 1% increase in size is associated with about 18% decrease in exit hazard, while a 
1% increase in IT trademarks is associated with a 31% decrease in exit hazard. Having 
proprietary security technology is beneficial -- a 1% increase in security patents is associated 
with 10% decrease in exit probability, though this effect is not statistically significant. Entry 
prior to the growth of the internet does not help survival. This suggests that the first mover 
advantage, if any, must manifest itself in scale, patents or marketing assets.  
Results in specification 2 suggest that omitting the number of competitors does not affect 
our principal results, and our estimate of competition by itself is small and insignificant. This is 
in part perhaps an artifact of measurement error in our measure of competitors: We do not 
include multi-product firms that operate in the same submarket. 18  
There are several possible sources of advantage that diversifiers may enjoy: scale economies, 
which enable firms to undertake larger fixed investments in improving efficiency and lowering 
cost (Cohen and Klepper, 1992), complementary capabilities (Teece, 1986), superior technology 
and R&D capabilities (Klepper and Simons, 2000a), or superior marketing capabilities (Mitchell, 
1989).  A variant is the suggestion that it is early entry rather than incumbency which matters, 
because early entry allows more time for growth and the consequent benefits of scale (Klepper, 
1996; Klepper and Simons, 2000).  Since we control for patents, IT trademarks, and size at entry, 
and because related startups (including spinoffs from security firms themselves) do not perform 
better than unrelated startups, it appears that these do not exhaust the sources of this superior 
                                                 
18Although we are able to identify the market where the firm initially enters, it is likely that some firms operate in 
multiple markets thereafter.  Thus, our measure of the number of producers in a market is likely to have considerable 
measurement error.  It appears that this error attenuates the estimated coefficient of the number of producers, but 
does not appear to affect estimates of other variables. 
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operating efficiency.  Nor is it due to experience in the ICT industry per se. Though we 
acknowledge that our proxies for scale, marketing and technology are imperfect, the results 
potentially point to additional sources of advantage for incumbent firms diversifying into the 
ISM.  These may include superior managerial capability or managerial routines, existing 
relationships with corporate clients, or superior financial resources.  It may also simply reflect 
strategic differences between diversifiers and startups in the value of “staying on” in the ISM.  
Result 3 implies that specialized technology suppliers should increase the average rate of 
exit from product markets. Indeed, from column 1, a 1% increase in the number of technology 
suppliers is associated with about a 2% increase in exit probability.  This is an interesting result. 
It suggests that though they lower entry barriers and increase entry, by increasing subsequent 
competition, technology markets do also increase exit.   
In specifications 3 and 4 we test result 5. We interact our measure of the number of 
technology suppliers with our measures of scale, marketing and proprietary technology.  In 
column 4, we additionally interact the number of technology suppliers with the dummy for ICT 
diversifiers. 
Results of specification 3 show that the increase in exit rates is moderated by trademarks 
and scale. The results imply that a 1% increase in IT trademarks is associated with about a 23% 
decrease in the hazard of exit in the absence of technology suppliers, whereas a 1% increase in 
IT trademarks is associated with about a 65% decrease in the average hazard of exit for every 
percentage increase in technology suppliers. Thus every percentage point increase in technology 
suppliers implies an additional 42% advantage for every 1% increase in the ownership of IT 
trademarks. The estimates with respect to size are similar. In markets that do no have any 
technology suppliers, a 1% increase in size implies a 13% decrease in the average hazard of exit. 
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However, in product markets that have technology suppliers, a 1% increase in technology 
suppliers implies an additional 57% reduction in the average hazard of exit for every percentage 
point change in size. 
Table 10-Cox proportional Hazard regressions of exit 
  Spec. 1 Spec 2  Spec. 3  Spec. 4  Spec. 5  
ICT firms dummy -1.38 *** -1.37 *** -1.72 *** -2.83 * -1.59 *** 
  
(0.24) 
  
(0.21) 
  
(0.21) 
  
(1.80) 
  
(0.21) 
  
Competitors -0.01 
  -   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02 * 
  
(0.01) 
     
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
Encryption market dummy 0.35 
  
0.36 
  
0.30 
  
0.36 
  
- 
  
  
(0.36) 
  
(0.42) 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.29) 
  
 
  
Log(1+tech. suppliers) 0.69 *** 0.71 *** 1.09 *** 1.07 * 0.69 ** 
  
(0.16) 
  
(0.16) 
  
(0.30) 
  
(0.27) 
  
(0.16) 
  
Diversifier*log(1+tech. suppliers) - 
  
- 
  
 
  
0.54 
  
- 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(0.53) 
  
 
  
Log (1+ sec. patents) -0.10 
  
-0.17 
  
-0.29 
  
-0.22 
  
-0.10 
  
  
(0.12) 
  
(0.13) 
  
(0.56) 
  
(0.80) 
  
(0.12) 
  
Log(1+tech supp.)*(log(1+sec.patents)) - 
  
- 
  
0.13 
  
0.13 
  
- 
  
  
 
  
 
  
(0.41) 
  
(0.39) 
  
 
  
Log (1 + IT trademarks) -0.36 *** -0.37 *** -0.26   -0.21   -0.36 *** 
  
(0.09) 
  
(0.43) 
  
(0.20) 
  
(0.19) 
  
(0.10) 
  
Log(1+tech.supp)*(log(1+trademarks))  
  
 
  
-0.29 * -0.31   -   
  
 
  
 
  
(0.17) 
  
(0.28) 
  
 
  
Cohort dummy 80-95 0.27 
 
0.36 
 
0.34 
 
0.34 
 
0.27 
  
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.30) 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.26) 
  
(0.25) 
  
Size not reported dummy -0.44 
  
-0.41 
  
-0.01 
  
-0.01 *** -0.44 ** 
  
(0.46) 
  
(0.46) 
  
(0.21) 
  
(0.28) 
  
(0.46) 
  
Log(1+tech.suppliers)*log(size)  
  
 
  
-0.84 *** -0.84 *** -   
  
 
  
 
  
(0.15) 
  
(0.16) 
  
 
  
(1-Size not reported)*log (size) at entry -0.21 *** -0.19 *** -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.20 *** 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.03) 
  
Spinoff dummy - 
  
- 
  
- 
  
 
  
-0.28 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(0.58) 
  
Related startups dummy - 
  
- 
  
- 
  
 
  
0.09 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(0.21) 
  
Unrelated startups dummy - 
  
- 
  
- 
  
 
  
-0.61 ***  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(0.12) 
  
ISM tenure -0.27 *** -0.27 *** -0.31 *** -0.31 *** -0.31 *** 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
(0.03) 
  
ISM tenure2 -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 ***  -0.01 *** -0.01 *** 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
N 326 
  
326 
  
326 
  
326 
  
326 
  
Sub market dummies(7) None 
  
None 
  
None 
  
None 
  
Yes 
  
LL -337.15 
  
-339.77 
  
-332.54 
  
-332.51 
  
-335.73 
  
Notes: ***Significant at 1%.  ** Significant at 5%.  * Significant at 10%.  Startups have no trademarks at entry. 
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The interaction between patent and technology suppliers is, however, small and 
insignificant. When we further interact diversifiers and technology suppliers (specification 4), 
the estimated coefficient of the interaction between IT trademarks and technology suppliers is 
statistically insignificant.  Other results however do not change much. That the impact of markets 
for technology differs by scale and marketing assets confirms the predictions of Result 5.  
Equally important, it provides reassurance that what we are measuring is not simply the result of 
unobserved differences across markets. 
Our findings on performance by different types of entrants also reinforce the findings in 
the literature. First, diversifying entrants perform better than startups.  This finding is very 
similar to similar findings in other industries such as automobiles (Carroll et at 1996), televisions 
(Klepper & Simmons 2000) and ship-building (Thompson 2002).  We find that markets for 
technology magnify the importance of these other assets, particularly scale and marketing assets. 
Intuitively, where well-functioning technology markets exist, operational efficiency becomes 
even more relevant for performance. 
Robustness and alternative explanations: 
It is possible that our estimates are picking up the heterogeneity between entrant types not 
adequately controlled for in the regressions. We explore if this affects our principal results of 
interest using specifications 3 of table 9 and specification 5 of table 10. In both these 
specifications, we control for different types of entrants not simply between diversifying ICT 
firms and startups. Our principal results are substantively unchanged, suggesting that the 
heterogeneity if any between different entrants do not significantly bias our estimates. However, 
in the performance regression, in which, we also distinguish among the different types of startups 
(specification 5 of table 10), indicates two other surprising effects of prior experience. Contrary 
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to expectations, spinoffs and startups founded by employees of ICT firms do not perform as well 
as unrelated startups. Startups founded by founders from unrelated industries perform markedly 
better than all other types of startups, albeit not as well as diversifiers. These results suggest that 
prior operational experience of diversifying ICT firms perhaps does not explain why diversifiers 
perform better.  We discuss this finding in greater detail below.  
Next, we test the robustness of our results with respect the hypotheses that relate to 
market for technology. A possible concern is that our estimates reflect unobserved differences 
between the various market segments.  To address this concern, we estimated the differences in 
the entry strategy of firms with and without patents, and how the presence of technology 
suppliers differentially affected the entry strategy of these groups. To further explore the 
robustness of our results, especially those that relate to Result 2, we identified if firms within the 
encryption market (authentication and network security submarkets) entered by licensing an 
encryption technology at the time of entry (licensee =1) or not (licensee =0). Of a total of 216 
firms in encryption based product markets, we were able to identify this for a sub-sample of 120 
firms. Of these, 20 firms do not report their size. Hence we use 100 observations in the 
regression that relates to entry strategy, while we use 120 observations in the survival regression. 
This sample has similar characteristics (not reported here) as the sample of all firms in the 
encryption market.  
We first test if increased competition in encryption technology market encourages firms 
to enter the ISM by licensing an encryption technology. Since the decision to license and 
entering downstream segment may be simultaneously determined, we implement a bivariate 
probit regression (results presented in table 11) in which, the dependent variables are 
37 
downstream and licensee. Using log(1+security patents) we also test if licensees are firms that 
do not have a proprietary technology of their own in the licensor equation.   
Table 11-Results with observed source of technology, encryption market only 
    Entry: Bivariate probit regression 
Exit: Cox prop. 
regression  
  
  DOWNSTREAM=1 LICENSEE=1 
  
ICT firms dummy 0.61 *** 0.19   -1.53 * 
  
  (0.14) 
  
(0.14) 
  (0.87)   
Competitors -   -   -0.01   
  
   
  
 
  (0.01)   
Log(1+tech. suppliers) -0.07   0.15 * 1.87 ** 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.09) 
 (0.88)  
Licencees -  -  1.21 * 
 
 
 
 
 (0.69)  
Licensee*Log(1+tech.supp.)     -0.88 *** 
  
  (0.09) 
  
(0.09) 
  (0.23)   
Log (1+ sec. patents) -0.39 ** -0.11 *** -0.43 **  
  
  (0.21) 
  
(0.03) 
  (0.19)   
Log (1+IT trademarks) 0.59 *** 0.05   -0.28 * 
  
  (0.03) 
  
(0.05) 
  (0.17) 
  
ISM tenure - 
  
 
  
-0.24 *** 
     
  
 
  (0.13) 
  
ISM tenure2   - 
  
 
  
-0.02 *** 
  
   
  
 
  (0.00)   
Cohort 80-95 dummy -0.49   -0.35   0.59   
  
  (0.74) 
  
(0.34) 
  (0.91)   
Industry age -8.40 *** -0.09   -   
  
  (0.27) 
  
(0.32) 
  
 
  
Industry age squared 0.13 *** 0.001   -   
  
  (0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  
   
no size dummy -   -   0.25   
  
   
  
 
  (0.36)   
Log(1+Size)   0.06   0.21 *** -1.90 *** 
  
  (0.05) 
  
(0.03) 
  (0.42)   
Related startups 0.77 *** 0.01   0.19   
  
  (0.07) 
  
(0.04) 
  (0.37)   
Spinoff dummy 0.09   -0.18 *** -1.36 *** 
  
  (0.17) 
  
(0.07) 
  (0.62)   
Unrelated dummy 0.21 *** -0.29 *** -0.58 *  
  
  (0.03) 
  
(0.08) 
  (0.36)   
Constant   131.8 *** -1.39   -   
  
  (3.87) 
  
(5.09) 
  
   
LL   -110.87 -82.52 
Sub market dummies (7) None None 
Ρ   0.05*    -   
  
  
 
(0.03)       
N   100 120 
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Notes: ***Significant at 1%.  ** Significant at 5%.  * Significant at 10%.  20 firms in this sample do not report size 
at entry. 
 
The results reinforce the results on entry discussed earlier. In the licensee equation, the 
coefficient of technology suppliers is positive and significant suggesting that the number of 
technology suppliers encourage entry by licensing. The coefficient of log(1+security patents) is 
negative and significant, reinforcing the finding that firms with proprietary technology are less 
likely to enter by licensing. The coefficient estimate of ICT firms dummy is positive, albeit 
marginally significant, suggesting diversifying ICT firms are more likely to enter by licensing. 
The results of the downstream equation reinforce the principal results stated in the previous 
section. Since these results are only for encryption based markets, they suggest that the role of 
unobserved heterogeneity across markets, if any, do not significantly bias the principal results 
presented in the previous section. 
We then test the robustness of our performance results. We use the same set of controls 
as in table 10. In addition we use licensee dummy as well as licensee dummy interacted with 
log(1+tech. suppliers). The results, shown in column 2 of table 11, reinforce our main findings. 
The number of technology suppliers increases the hazard of exit on an average. Moreover, 
licensees perform well only when they are many technology suppliers. Once again, these results 
suggest that it is unlikely that our principal findings are driven by unobserved differences 
between encryption and non-encryption markets but rather due to the effects of market for 
technology. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Our results from the analysis of entry and exit in ISM confirm the principal findings in the 
literature, but also provide some interesting avenues for further research.  They confirm the 
independent role of technology, marketing, and scale in facilitating performance and 
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conditioning entry.  Despite this, differences in the type of entrant have large effects in both 
entry and exit.  In particular, diversifiers outperform startups, including spinoffs and startups 
from related industries, indicating that incumbent firms diversifying into a new industry bring 
not just size, marketing assets, proprietary technology and experience, but also something else, 
which appears conditions entry strategy and to confer significant survival benefit.   
This is corroborated by how entry and survival respond to the presence of markets for 
technology, which appear to enhance the advantages of operational efficiency, whose source we 
conjecture may lie in superior firm-routines (for instance, to maintain and upgrade products), 
superior management ability, or perhaps superior relationships with existing customers.   
The source of the advantages enjoyed by incumbent ICT firms diversifying into information 
security markets cannot be conclusively answered.  Not only do we fail to measure all the 
possible sources of advantage, but those that we do measure, we measure only imperfectly.  
Trademarks may not capture all important elements of marketing assets, such as the quality of 
the sales and marketing teams, existing relationships with customers, or the level of branding. 
Similarly, patents are but one manifestation of the technology.  Clever virus researchers rarely 
produce patentable technology. Yet, without their ability to detect and counter new viruses and 
worms, the scanning and pattern matching technology that underpins anti-virus products (and 
which is patentable) would not be very useful. 
Even with these qualifications our results point to some interesting avenues for further 
research.  In particular, the finding that firms founded by founders from unrelated industries 
perform better than other startups, including those with founders with ICT experience, as well as 
spinoffs from information security firms themselves, requires further exploration.  We conjecture 
that the ISM differs from many of the industries studied by other scholars in the area of 
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entrepreneurship in several important aspects.  The first is the absence of manufacturing.  
Although software products must be scaled up, maintained and enhanced, they do not require the 
large fixed investments of manufacturing, the reduction of production costs for performance, or 
the associated benefit of manufacturing experience.  Undoubtedly, this is an important reason 
that unrelated startups can succeed. 
Second, the widespread use of information technology and the relative ease of obtaining raw 
material for R&D (such as access to computers and software) perhaps allows individuals that do 
not have technical expertise to tinker with existing software in order to develop valuable ideas.  
One can perhaps draw parallels to the success of private inventors such as Edison at the turn of 
the century.  We speculate that the nature of the industry makes it possible for entrepreneurs with 
meager resources to tinker, develop innovations, and in some cases, hold their own against 
larger, established rivals.  It may also be that software offers the possibility of creating many 
more niches as compared with manufactured products, perhaps because one does not need large 
fixed investments in manufacturing. 
Third, the lack of success enjoyed by related startups and spinoffs as compared to startups 
from other backgrounds is also intriguing, particularly since other researchers have found a very 
significant role for pre-entry industry experience.  We conjecture that this reflects the general 
purpose nature of software technologies.  Banks, insurance firms, government organizations – all 
are likely to have substantial in-house capability for information security. Thus, they are also 
plausibly potent sources for creating new firms dealing with information security. In this, ISM 
may differ from products such as televisions, radios, and automobiles, though perhaps not lasers. 
Fourth, differences in the nature of demand across encryption and other markets may also be 
important. Economists frequently assume, implicitly or otherwise, that buyers are households.  
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Though households do buy anti-virus and spam control products, network security products 
(such as VPN) are largely bought by businesses.  In their purchase decisions, the price and 
quality of the product are not the only considerations; businesses also place considerable weight 
on the reputation and reliability of the seller, and whether they have established business 
relationships with the seller.  Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that even individuals without 
significant technical experience but perhaps with superior technical skills and more importantly a 
willingness to monitor and respond to ongoing developments (such as the release of new viruses 
and worms) could break into markets where households are an important source of demand.19  
However, established firms would hold sway in markets dominated by business buyers, 
particularly if they could get access to technology via a market for technology, as is true for 
encryption products. 
Finally, the most important insights from our results are in the impact of the vertical structure 
of the industry on entry and exit.  Specifically, our research shows how markets for technology 
conditions entry, exit and competition. Markets for technology encourage vertical specialization 
and increases entry, especially by firms that do not have proprietary technology. However, a 
competitive technology market also stimulates competition in the related product market and 
increases exit rates. In particular markets for technology increase the relative importance of hard- 
to-replicate-assets such as marketing ability and scale, while they hasten exit by firms that do not 
hold these assets.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 In firewalls, the ability to sell an “add-on” product, rather than one that would be deeply embedded in the buyer’s 
network infrastructure also helped.   
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Appendix 1 Proof of propositions 
 
Appendix : 
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium and signing the impact of an increase in b on p and 
M.  It is helpful to characterize the relationship between p and M implied by equilibrium in the 
product market (the PP curve) and the licensing market (TT curve). 
1. The PP curve is downward sloping and TT curve is upward sloping. 
Let 
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The endogenous variables are p and M. Let A11, A12 denote the partial derivatives of (A3) with 
respect to p and M respectively, and likewise A21, A22 from (A4). we have, A11dp+A12dM =0 and 
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iff )(1
)(
ZF
Zfcp
−
>
−
τ
, which in turn is implied by )(1
)(
ZF
Zfcp
−
>
+
−
τθ
. This implies A22 > 0. 
Thus 0
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A
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Stability requires |H| >0 i.e., A11 A22 > A21 A12, which is satisfied. 
2. Next we show that 0<
db
dp
 
Let A1b be the partial derivative of (1) with respect to b.  
0)(1)())((1(
)(')1( 1
11 <




















−
−
−−
−
= ∫
∞
Z
b
b ZF
dFqH
ZZH
cpZF
Zf
TA
τλ
 
Let A2b be the partial derivative of (2) with respect to b. 
 12 −=bA  
Thus 0||
122221 <
−
=
H
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dp bb
 
3. Next we show that 0<
db
dL
 
Note that )(XfT
L
M λ=
∂
∂
. Totally differentiating L, we obtain 
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Since, )(1
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, 0<
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. 
4. Next we show that 0>
db
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Using equation A4 and totally differentiating it w.r.t b we obtain 
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5. Result 1 is obvious from figure 1 and the proof is omitted. 
6. Proof of result 2 
For firms with technology Pr(downstream| entry)≡ φ =λ(1-F(X)) 
0)( >
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b
LXf
b γ
λφ
 
Firms that enter through licensing by definition enter downstream. Therefore, if there is an 
increase in the probability of entry of firms without technology, the overall proportion of entrants 
entering downstream must increase. 
To see that entry by firms without technology increases, note that an increase in b lowers 
p. For p to fall there has to be additional production in the product market.  This increase in 
production cannot be due to firms with technology, since their expected profits in the product 
market are lower, and lower prices will not imply additional entry of firms endowed with 
technology.  Therefore, it must be due to entry of firms without technology. 
 
7. Proof of result 3: 
The exit probability of exit conditional entry, averaged over firms of different sizes is 
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Note that 0)()(
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, as shown below.   
Consider entry for firms that do not have a technology of their own. The proof of result 2 
established that a firms without  technology of their own are more likely to enter when b 
increases. Implicitly this means that 0)( >
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8. Proof of result 4 
For a given q )1()1()Pr( 21 HHExit −+−≡  
( ) 0)()()Pr( 21 <−−+−−=∂
∂ γcphcph
q
Exit
 
9. Proof of result 5 
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∂ hhqhcpqhcp
b
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Exit γ  
Where h1’ and h2’ are the partial derivatives w.r.t h1 and h2 respectively. This result is true for 
many distributions such as normal and exponential where the pdf’s are differentiable (instances 
provided below).  
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Case1: If ε is distributed as exponential then 
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Case2: If ε is distributed as normal, then 
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